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HEURISTICS, BIASES, AND PHILOSOPHY
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
Commenting on Professor Cass Sunstein's work is a daunting task. There is
simply so much of it. Professor Sunstein produces scholarship at a rate that is faster than
I can consume it. Scarcely an area of law has failed to feel his impact. One cannot today
write an article on administrative law, free speech, punitive damages, Internet law, law
and economics, separation of powers, or animal rights law without addressing one or
more of Sunstein's papers. And his work is typically not a mere footnote. Sunstein has
changed how scholars think about each of these areas of law. More broadly, his work
has made his mark on psychology, economics, and political science. But, surprisingly,
one of his most subversive, and important, articles, Moral Heuristics, is directed
primarily at philosophers.'
Sunstein's Moral Heuristics approaches the gates of philosophical discourse like a
Trojan Horse. The article's title uses the well-known jargon of psychology. This is no
surprise, as the piece is published in a psychological journal (albeit one known for
sometimes engaging in philosophical inquiry). It thus seems that the piece will be
another of his many valuable conversions of psychological research into legal concepts.
Sunstein is well know for mining out nuggets of social and cognitive psychology that
have been previously ignored by legal scholars and demonstrating that an understanding
of these principles is actually critical for understanding some area of law. But Moral
Heuristics is not such a piece. It brings some psychological research to bear on legal
issues, but the piece is more ambitious than that. It provides a new way for both
psychologists and legal scholars to think about the concept of heuristics. It then uses this
new approach to challenge the basic epistemological assumptions of contemporary moral
philosophy.
The basic thesis of Moral Heuristics is that people rely on simple habits of the
mind when thinking about moral issues.2 As in many areas of life, they do not adhere to
principles of deductive logic. They resist relying on broad-based optimization strategies
(such as cost-benefit analysis) as a means of addressing hard moral questions in favor of
simple rules of thumb. For example, Sunstein argues that people avoid making decisions
that they know will result in the death of another person.3 This is a good principle to
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 Behavioral & Brain Sci. 531 (2005).
2. Id. at 531-32 ("[l~t is important to see that some of our deeply held moral beliefs might be products of
heuristics that sometimes produce mistakes.").
3. Id. at 536 (articulating the rule: "Do not knowingly cause a human death." (emphasis omitted)).
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follow, of course, but blind application of it can lead to paradox because some fatalities
are more invisible than others. The principle can produce condemnation of those who
account for less visible, indirect fatalities, as happens in cost-benefit analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis makes indirect fatalities transparent, thereby making those who rely on it
seem callous, even if they are trying to minimize the total fatality rate.
4
But Sunstein's admonition against using overly simple habits of mind to assess
complex choices in modem society is not what is novel about this paper. Many of his
papers engage in that kind of exposition. What sets this paper apart is how he uses the
concept of heuristics. In this paper, Sunstein uses the idea of mental shortcuts in a highly
contextual way. He seems, at times, to be inventing new heuristics. New to this paper
are terms such as the "'cold-heart heuristic' ' 5 and the "'do not play God"' heuristic. 6
And obviously the 'Justice Antonin Scalia heuristic"' is not one psychologists would
have heard before. 7 Implicit in this move is that Sunstein must be arguing that the
mental shortcuts that people are taking are highly specific. They are not global habits of
mind that people use in all places to suit all purposes. Rather, people seize upon these
heuristics to solve certain problems. That is a novel move and one that nicely embraces
some of the criticisms levied against the concept of heuristics, both in psychology and in
law, and shows them to be modifications, rather than criticisms.
The second novel claim of the paper is its main target. In asserting that the
psychological concept of heuristics speaks directly to the epistemology of moral
philosophy, Sunstein attacks the foundations of contemporary moral philosophy.
8
Sunstein argues that people reject deductive logic in their approach to statistical and
probabilistic reasoning, preferring instead to rely on heuristics that are often inconsistent
with logic. Consequently, creating a workable, internally coherent mathematics based on
people's intuitions about numbers would be a foolish undertaking. Sunstein argues that
the same is true for moral philosophy. Intuitions about moral issues, he contends, are no
more apt to be coherent than intuitions about probability theory.9 Therefore, founding a
normative theory of moral philosophy upon intuition is just as misguided as founding
mathematics on intuition. And yet, that is exactly what contemporary moral
philosophers undertake.
I flesh out these issues in this paper. First, I discuss how Sunstein's approach to
heuristics differs from what many psychologists adopt and how this new approach
addresses some of the criticism levied at the heuristics and biases literature. Second, I
review how this new approach undergirds Sunstein's critique of moral philosophy.
4. Id. ("When people object to risky action taken after cost-benefit analysis, it seems to be partly because
that very analysis puts the number of expected deaths squarely 'on screen."' (citation omitted)).
5. Id.
6. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 539.
7. Id. at 533 ("If students are unsure how to analyze a constitutional problem, they might ask instead what
Justice Scalia ... thinks-and either follow him or do the opposite.").
8. Id. at 531 ("We should not treat the underlying moral intuitions as fixed points for analysis, rather than
as unreliable and potentially erroneous.").
9. Id. at 542 ("[l]n particular cases, sensible rules of thumb lead to demonstrable errors... in the domains
of morality, politics, and law .... ).
[Vol. 43:865
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I. A NEW APPROACH TO HEURISTICS
Sunstein's approach to judgment and decision making in Moral Heuristics
represents a significant departure from the approaches seen in both law and psychology.
It also represents a departure from his own use of the concept. This break from the past
addresses many of the criticisms of the "heuristics and biases" paradigm and puts the
work on firmer footing for application to law and beyond.
A. The Origins of Heuristics and Biases
Most of the psychological research on judgment and decision making that has
filtered into the legal literature has its origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the
study of the cognitive processes underlying memory and perception. 10 The primary
methodological approach at the time was to study the ways that memory and perception
might go astray. For example, psychologists studying memory found that when they
presented people with lists of words to memorize, people more easily remember the
words at the beginning (primacy) and at the end of the lists (recency). I I From this
pattern, psychologists inferred that memory includes a short-term storage buffer with
limited capacity. At the beginning of the list, the short-term buffer is not yet fully
engaged, and hence, it can be used for active rehearsal of the words. At the end of the
list, the buffer is not clouded with subsequent words and can be used to facilitate the
transfer of the words into long-term storage. The errors in memory, in effect, guide the
cognitive theory of how memory works. 
12
Research on human perception operates the same way as research on memory.
Consider the Mailler-Lyer illusion below. 13 Although the parallel lines are identical in
length, the lower line looks longer. The arrows cause the illusion by taking advantage of
how people use clues to depth perception. The lines mimic the way parallel lines look as
they run away from the perceiver, which normally provides an excellent clue to distance
and size.
In this instance, the clues that normally facilitate accurate perception of the horizon
instead lead people to misperceive the lines. The illusion shows how the mind normally
10. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1165,
1169-70 (2003) (describing the origins of the psychological research on judgment and choice).
11. See Eugene B. Zechmeister & Stanley E. Nyberg, Human Memory: An Introduction to Research and
Theory 60-71 (Brooks/Cole Publg. Co. 1982) (reviewing research on primacy and recency effects in memory).
12. See Michael J. Watkins & Endel Tulving, Episodic Memory: When Recognition Fails, 104 J.
Experimental Psychol.: Gen. 5 (1975) (describing how memory researchers make inferences from errors).
13. Wikipedia, Miller-Lyer Illusion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MC3%BCller-Lyerillusion (last
accessed Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the Mfiller-Lyer Illusion).
2008]
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processes depth perception. The arrows provide the clues that the brain uses to make the
judgment as to which is longer. The illusion is interesting by itself, but what is more
important is how it reveals the way the brain processes this kind of information.
The early work on judgment and decision making by psychologists transported the
same principles used in the study of memory and perception into the study of judgment
and choice. In particular, Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970s began to devise
experiments meant to identify specific ways in which judgment and choice would depart
from a fully rational model. 14 Tversky and Kahneman began using the concept of
perfect rationality as a foil, knowing full well that they could show deviations from
perfection, just as researchers on memory and perception did. And just as the memory
and perception researchers crafted unusual methodologies to test the limits of memory
and perception, Tversky and Kahneman began to craft exotic decision-making tasks to
study judgment.
The well-known scenario of Linda the bank teller, which Sunstein discusses in his
article,15 is typical of this kind of work. Tversky and Kahneman presented people with a
description of Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
[Which is more probable?]
[1.] Linda is a bank teller.
[2.] Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 16
Deductive logic dictates that it must be more likely that Linda is a bank teller than
that Linda is both a bank teller and active in the feminist movement because the latter is
a subset of the former. And yet, most people presented with this question conclude that
it more likely she is both a bank teller and active in the feminist movement.
Just as the departures from perfect memory allow researchers to make inferences
about how the mnemonic system works, this departure from rational choice allows for an
inference as to how people make judgments of this type. Tversky and Kahneman argued
that this problem represents an example of how judgment departs from the ideal of
rational choice. People rely on the feeling that Linda seems like she would be active in
the feminist movement in making the judgment. 17 The judgment, however, is not one
that calls for a reliance on intuition; it is best made by the application of deductive logic.
14. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci.
1124, 1124-25 (1974).
15. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 532 (describing this problem).
16. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 84, 92 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge
U. Press 1982).
17. Id. at 97 ("[P]eople evaluate the probability of events by the degree to which these events are
representative of a relevant model or process.").
[Vol. 43:865
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But Tversky and Kahneman show that people seem to rely on their feelings rather than
logic. And in this case, their feelings lead them astray. They rely on what Tversky and
Kahneman called the "representativeness heuristic," which is founding probabilistic
judgments on the apparent similarity between an instance and the general category,
rather than on deductive logic. 
18
Other examples illustrate the method even more clearly. Tversky and Kahneman
argued than when making an assessment as to how likely or common some events are,
people rely on a sense of the ease with which instances of the event can be called to
mind. For example, in one study, Tversky and Kahneman provided subjects with lists of
people's names (both first names and surnames). 19 They then took away the list and
asked the subjects to estimate whether there were more male or female names on the list.
Having used clearly gendered names and having put an equal number of male and female
names on the lists, they reasoned that if memory were simply following rules of logic,
people would be as likely to conclude that there were more men on the list as they would
be to conclude that there were more women. But, they cheated a bit by putting names of
celebrities on the lists. When the lists included more male than female celebrities, the
subjects tended to conclude there were more men than women. When there were more
women celebrities on the list, the subjects tended to conclude that there were more
women on the list. Because celebrities' names were easier to recall, Tversky and
Kahneman reasoned that people are relying on ease of recall as a means of assessing
frequency. They termed this process the "availability" heuristic.
20
The insight of Tversky and Kahneman and other early pioneers of this work was
precisely that when people make decisions, they rely on the same kinds of systems that
support memory and perception. 2 1  Cognitive psychologists assumed that human
memory does not work the same way as a tape recorder, but they also reasoned that the
departures from the concept of human memory as a tape recorder could provide insights
into the underlying cognitive systems supporting memory. Likewise, cognitive
psychologists studying human judgment and choice rejected the idea that human
judgment and choice perfectly followed deductive logic and rationality, but they also
reasoned that departures from this vision of human judgment would give clues as to how
these systems actually worked. And thus, the methodology that produced insights into
the understanding of memory and perception should produce insights into understanding
ofjudgment and choice as well.
Within psychology, this work quickly became known as the "heuristics and biases
approach" to studying human judgment and choice. 22 Its influence grew quickly in
psychology and then spread to other disciplines. This approach undergirds what has
come to be known as behavioral law and economics.
18. Tversky & Kahneman, supra n. 14, at 1124.
19. Id. at 1127.
20. Id.
21. See Rachlinski, supra n. 10, at 1170.
22. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 Psychol. Rev. 582, 582
(1996) (emphasis omitted) ("Some time ago we introduced a program of research on judgment under
uncertainty, which has come to be known as the heuristics and biases approach." (citation omitted)).
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B. Criticisms of the "Heuristics and Biases Approach" to Human Judgment
The heuristics and biases approach to assessing human judgment has extraordinary
strengths. It provides a simple, inexpensive methodology for studying human judgment
and decision making. It also capitalizes on the enormous success of the cognitive
psychology of memory and perception in documenting how the brain functions. But, it
also inspires criticisms. It arguably fails to account for variations in human ability in
judgment, fails to account for motivated reasoning processes, and simply makes people
seem too inept. Sunstein's new approach addresses these concerns. But first, I will lay
them out below.
1. The Nomothetic Assumption
Most forms of cognitive psychology embrace a nomothetic approach. 23 That is,
cognitive psychology assumes that everyone relies upon fundamentally similar cognitive
processes. For human memory, the nomothetic assumption might be largely accurate.
For example, virtually everyone who has a normally functioning brain exhibits both
primacy and recency effects. The basic methodology of identifying notable departures
from a simple model of memory as a tape recorder is a robust one that has produced
something close to a set of basic laws of the human mnemonic system. The study of
perception has followed a similar course. Absent unusual circumstances, most visual
illusions have the same effect on most adults.
Because the research on human judgment and choice uses similar methods to the
work on perception and memory, it naturally incorporates the same nomothetic
assumption. Just as memory researchers identified stable mechanisms, like short-term
memory, that produce stable phenomena, like primacy and recency, and just like the
studies of perception reveal a stable illusion, so too have most researchers in the
psychology of judgment and choice assumed that they would identify stable cognitive
processes that underlie all human judgment. This led the early researchers to describe
the cognitive processes that they uncovered as if they were universal facets of the human
mind.
24
In an early paper, for example, Tversky and Kahneman described the cognitive
processes of representativeness and availability as if they were as universal as short-term
memory. 25 They claimed that representativeness was the principal means by which
people make judgments as to whether a particular exemplar is a member of a broader
category. Similarly, they proposed that people persistently rely on the availability
heuristic when making frequency judgments. 26 Tversky and Kahneman ultimately
quantified some of their findings on other aspects of judgment and choice (loss aversion
and the psychophysics of probability) into a rule-like, almost axiomatic, system of
23. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev.
207, 209-10 (2006) (describing the "nomothetic foundation of behavioral law and economics" as arising from
cognitive psychology).
24. Id.
25. Tversky & Kahneman, supra n. 14, at 1124.
26. Id. at 1127.
[Vol. 43:865
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judgment about risky events that they termed "Prospect Theory." 2 7
It was understandable that Tversky and Kahneman incorporated the nomothetic
assumption that underlies memory and perception into the psychology of judgment and
choice. They were both trained as mathematical psychologists-an area of psychology
that produces precise models of human perception. And the methods that they adopted
from memory and perception had proven enormously fruitful in these cognitive domains.
It is natural that they would assume that judgment would function the same way.
The nomothetic assumption that describes human perception and memory so well,
however, might not hold true for human judgment and choice.2 8 The data supporting the
phenomena that researchers in judgment and choice rely upon is more erratic than the
data supporting the conclusions in human perception and memory. Consider the problem
involving Linda the bank teller as one example. Most people incorrectly conclude that
Linda is more likely to be a feminist bank teller than just a bank teller, but some also
come to the correct conclusion. 29 In contrast, no one with ordinary brain function fails
to exhibit primacy and recency effects in memory.
Human decision making might simply be more complex than perception and
memory. Problems of judgment can be seen in different ways. If people judge Linda
based on how things seem at a superficial level, they come to a different conclusion than
if they see the problem as a species of deductive logic. The fact that the problem can be
seen in different ways means that people with different backgrounds and experiences
might treat the problem differently. The same is not true of memory or perception.
2. Cultural Cognition
Are the variations in how people respond to the scenarios that researchers in
judgment and choice have crafted predictable? If not, the variations might just mean that
the scenarios are just noisy ways of measuring cognitive error. Recent research in
"cultural cognition," however, suggests that the variations are both systematic and
predictable. 30 Cultural cognition shows that people rely on different ways of thinking
about social risks. Although assessing risk is only one aspect of judgment and choice, it
has been a central one in the research. Hence, if the nomothetic assumption does not
apply to judgments about risk, then it is a troubling assumption.
In a series of studies, Dan Kahan and his colleagues have demonstrated that
different people's fears vary along political dimensions. 3 1 These researchers categorize
people according to the political attitude scales devised by Aaron Wildavsky, who argues
that political orientations tend to cluster along two dimensions: the hierarchy-egalitarian
27. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
Econometrica 263, 268-69 (1979).
28. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate? 23 Behavioral & Brain Sci. 645, 645 (2000).
29. Tversky & Kahneman, supra n. 16, at 93 (reporting that 89% of their participants erred when answering
the "Linda problem").
30. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 119-25 (2007) (describing the
cultural cognition project).
31. Id. at 122-23.
2008]
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dimension and the individual-communitarian dimension. 32 Hierarchs believe strongly in
rigid social structures while egalitarians believe in social mobility. Individuals believe
individual achievement is most critical to society while communitarians believe society
functions best in cooperative groups. According to Kahan and his colleagues, these
political dimensions predict the reactions that people have to various social risks.
33
As one example of these cultural variations in risk assessment, Kahan and his
colleagues have found that those who are individualists and hierarchs support gun
ownership as a safe undertaking but worry about crime and social disruption. 34 By
contrast, communitarians and egalitarians worry that widespread gun ownership itself
produces violence and worry less about low-level crime and social disruption. 35 Even on
technological risks, these groups vary according to their political beliefs. Individual-
hierarchs do not worry about nuclear power or global climate change, but they worry
about the HPV vaccine (designed to prevent cervical cancer caused by the spread of a
virus through sexual intercourse) and the risks of having an abortion. 36  Their
communitarian-egalitarian counterparts worry about nuclear power and climate change
but not so much about the HPV vaccine and abortions.
37
Kahan and his colleagues argue that this pattern of social fears affirms people's
identities and their place in society. 38 For example, people buy and own handguns in
part because of the role that they see themselves playing in their families and
communities. Gun owners see themselves as valuable members of their communities,
just as most people do, and, hence, they will not see gun ownership as something to be
feared. The same is true of people who sign petitions against nuclear power, or who
write their member of Congress about climate change. In effect, we are what we fear.
The cultural cognition project poses a serious challenge to the nomothetic
approach to research on judgment and choice. If people use the same kinds of processes,
why do they come to such different conclusions on which social risks are to be feared
and which ones are to be ignored? Consider how the nomothetic approach would treat
the availability and representativeness heuristics and the risk of nuclear power. The
widely reported nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, along with
fictitious depictions of problems at nuclear power plants in movies and on television,
ensure that most citizens have easy cognitive access to vibrant memories of the risks
posed by nuclear power. Similarly, nuclear power plants are easily associated with
nuclear weapons and radiation and generally seem like the kinds of activities that pose
serious risks (unlike radon in basements, for example). Together, these two heuristics
predict that everyone, except perhaps experts who do not rely on these heuristics, will
overestimate the risks posed by nuclear power. Kahan and his colleagues, however, find
32. Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference
Formation, 81 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 3, 11 (1987).
33. Kahan, supra n. 30, at 124.
34. Id. at 123.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Kahan, supra n. 30, at 123.
[Vol. 43:865
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that hierarchs tend not to be afraid of nuclear power nearly as much as egalitarians.
People who embrace different political orientations must use different cognitive
processes to assess risks and thereby reach different conclusions about which risks pose
real dangers.
To be sure, the availability heuristic allows for some individual differences in ways
that might account for some of the data that Kahan and his colleagues have obtained.
People might vary in the extent to which the risk is cognitively available to them, as they
might have different degrees of exposure to media coverage of Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl. Furthermore, people with different political orientations are apt to attend to
different materials in the media. But availability seems like only part of the story. The
research on cultural cognition links people's fears to their core beliefs about how they
see themselves. 39 The research supports the idea that social fears are the products of
motivated inferences. People must be selectively using different cognitive mechanisms
that convert the information they have into an assessment of risk. This conversion is
clearly not done in a uniform fashion.
40
3. Ecological Rationality
Finally, some psychologists have reacted with great skepticism to the idea that
cognitive biases in judgment could be widespread and uniform.4 1 Chief among these are
the evolutionary psychologists. For this school of thought, the human brain, like every
other organ in the human body, is best thought of as a system that has survived the rigors
of ancestral evolution. Elements of the brain and ways of thinking that gave our
ancestors evolutionary advantages were likely to be replicated and passed down through
the generations. Habits of thought that undermined our ancestors' abilities to procreate
successfully would have been systematically weeded out. Given this process, how could
it be that humans would continue to embrace ways of thinking about risk and uncertainty
that produce systematic errors in judgment?
Evolutionary psychologists contend that the other cognitive systems, such as
memory and perception, are well-suited to the tasks that faced our ancestors and remain
well-suited today. They contend that the heuristics and biases approach to judgment and
choice fails to account for the context in which decisions are often made and, hence, fails
to recognize the overwhelming advantages of relying on heuristics to make decisions.
This critique is often called the "ecological rationality" approach, as it embraces the
notion that people might make choices that seem irrational in rarified, constructed
scenarios but not in familiar, ordinary settings of everyday life.42
39. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 1071 (2006).
40. Variations in memory and perception have been documented as well, of course. But observed
variations in memory and perception do undermine researchers' faith in the basic model of memory or
perception. For example, although memory is better for familiar concepts, primacy and recency are still
observed among such concepts.
41. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart
(Stephen Stich ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).
42. Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in Gerd
2008]
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One of the best examples of this is illustrated by a study done by Leda Cosmides
and John Tooby. 43 They take on the "confirmation bias," which is the tendency for
people to attend to information that supports their beliefs while ignoring or avoiding
information that could disconfirm their beliefs. Confirmation bias is best illustrated with
the Wason card-selection task.44 In this task, people confront four cards that have letters
on one side and colors on the other. They are confronted with four cards, as described in
the question:
You are shown a set of four cards placed on a table, each of which has a number on one
side and a colored patch on the other side. The visible faces of the cards show 3, 8, red,
and brown. Which cards should you turn over in order to test the truth of the proposition
that if a card shows an even number on one face, then its opposite face shows a primary
color?
45
People who confront this task generally fail to turn over the cards that could
provide disconfirming information (that is, the 8 and the brown). Instead, they tend to
look for confirmation of the proposition by turning over the red card (although turning
over the 8 is also common). Even if the red card has an odd number on the back, this
would not refute the proposition stated.
Cosmides and Tooby demonstrated that adding a familiar context to the Wason
card-selection task makes it quite easy. For example, if the proposition is changed to "if
you are drinking alcohol then you must be over 18," and the cards have an age on one
side and beverage on the other, e.g., "17," "beer," "22," "coke," the task becomes much
easier and people generally select the correct cards ("17" and "beer"). 46 In effect, they
know how to search for people who might be defying the rules, as would be the case
with a 17-year old with a beer or a beer with a 17-year-old. Proponents of evolutionary
psychology argue that we are well programmed to identify instances of social defection.
We are not as well-suited to performing abstract tasks such as the one that Wason used,
but abstract tasks are not a central aspect of social life. The important incidents of social
risk and social judgment might arise in the kinds of contexts that humans are well-suited
to understanding. Humans could thus possess an ecologically based rationality that is
not properly tested by sterile tasks.
As is obvious from the problem involving Linda the bank teller, many of the
phenomena developed by researchers in judgment and choice are, in fact, described in
relevant social contexts. Evolutionary psychologists often challenge the validity of some
of the core studies in the heuristics and biases tradition.4 7 For example, some have
Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart 3, 5 (Stephen
Stich ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).
43. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in The Adapted Mind
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture 163, 181-83 (Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides &
John Tooby eds., Oxford U. Press 1992).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 183.
47. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians after All? Rethinking Some
Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty, 58 Cognition 1 (1996) (testing base rate
neglect, probabilistic reasoning, and conjunction fallacy with frequentist presentations); Gerd Gigerenzer, How
[Vol. 43:865
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argued that the results in the "Linda problem" are the result of a misunderstanding of the
nature of the question being asked; people may assume that the specificity of the answer
"Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" implies that the answer
"Linda is a bank teller" also means that Linda is not active in the feminist movement.
Careful deconstruction and reassessment of some of the core studies of judgment and
choice thus sometimes might reveal methodological flaws that undermine the basic
project.
Whether ecological rationality has been entirely successful is a matter of debate,
4 8
but proponents of ecological rationality have complicated the portrait of judgment and
choice. The drinking age variation on the Wason card-selection task is only one of many
instances in which heuristics that have been billed as universals do not seem to function.
4. Summary
Thus stands the three-pronged attack on the nomothetic assumption: the results of
the research reveal tendencies, rather than clear universals; different people selectively
use different heuristics to assess risk so as to support their cultural worldviews; and
people seem to use different heuristics even within the same type of problem.
Not only does this assault pose serious problems for the development of the
psychology of judgment and choice, but given the vast incorporation of this line of work
into legal scholarship, it poses problems for law as well. Through much of his work,
Sunstein describes numerous applications of heuristics to law. And in all cases, Sunstein
articulates reforms designed to avoid the influence of regular, predictable cognitive
biases. But if the biases are not so regular, then one-size-fits all reforms are not sensible.
And if they are not mistakes at all, as the proponents of ecological rationality contend,
then reform is not needed.
C. Sunstein 's Account
The approach to studying judgment and choice that Sunstein adopts in Moral
Heuristics represents a departure from the rigid, nomothetic assumption that is
vulnerable to these attacks. In arguing that people rely on cognitive shortcuts to think
about moral issues, Sunstein does not draw upon the usual set of heuristics like
availability and anchoring. He creates a new "catalogue" of heuristics:
* "Do not knowingly cause a human death '4 9
* "[T]he cold-heart heuristic" (punish those who adopt a calculating
approach to human life) 50
" "People should not be permitted to engage in moral wrongdoing for a
fee"51
to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and Biases ", 2 Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 83 (1991).
48. Kahneman & Tversky, supra n. 22 (arguing against the ecological rationality approach).
49. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 536 (emphasis omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 537 (emphasis omitted).
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* "Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust" (betrayal aversion) 52
* The "outrage heuristic" (use one's sense of outrage at an act to guide
decision concerning how much to punish a wrongdoing) 53
" "Do not tamper with nature"
54
Traces of some of these heuristics can be found in the existing literature on
judgment. The heuristic, "do not tamper with nature," resembles a documented
preference for natural things.55  The outrage heuristic is also similar to the affect
heuristic described by Paul Slovic. 56 And, as discussed below, the identification of an
influence of betrayal on judgment is not new. What is new in this catalogue, however, is
the implication that heuristics are not one-size-fits-all rules that apply in broad contexts,
but are highly specific mental shortcuts used to solve specific problems. It is a clear
departure from a purely nomothetic approach.
A close analysis of the concept of betrayal aversion makes the point. Sunstein
argues that people have a particular aversion to betrayal, and react more negatively to
57betrayals than to injuries caused outside the context of a betrayal. He relies largely on
the work of Koehler and Gershoff for this point.5 8 Koehler and Gershoff demonstrate, as
one example of betrayal aversion, that people state that they would assign more
punishment to a robbery committed by a security guard than by a stranger.59 Similarly,
people are more outraged when faulty wiring in a smoke alarm causes a factory fire than
when the same faulty wiring from a refrigerator causes the fire. Sunstein, following
Gershoff and Koehler, concludes that people simply treat betrayals as more egregious
than other kinds of harms.
Is Sunstein right to call betrayal aversion a heuristic? Koehler and Gershoff
demurred on the exact terminology, and Sunstein himself worries that it might be better
described as a "taste." 6 1 Betrayal aversion might be the product of a set of as yet
unidentified cognitive processes rather than a heuristic unto itself But Sunstein likens it
to a mental process of identifying those actions that people see as betrayals, and treating
them with greater moral intensity than similar acts not so categorized. And indeed, the
data from Koehler and Gershoff suggest that betrayal aversion functions like the
application of a simple rule. The betrayal aversion they identify operates in a wide
variety of settings. People even make efforts to avoid situations that might expose them
52. Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 538 (emphasis omitted).
54. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 539 (emphasis omitted).
55. See Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectives from the Study of Contagion, in Risk, Media,
and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology 31 (James Flynn, Paul
Slovic & Howard Kunreuther eds., Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2001).
56. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
397 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., Cambridge U. Press 2002).
57. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 537-38.
58. Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When Agents of Protection Become
Agents of Harm, 90 Organizational Behavior & Human Dec. Processes 244 (2003).
59. Id. at 246.
60. Id. at 250.
61. Sunstein, supra n. 1,at 537.
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to the risk of betrayal, such as vaccines and airbags, even when doing so harms them.
62
It thus seems to function like a mental shortcut that cuts off further analysis--once
encountering betrayal, punish more and do not analyze the situation further.
Although it functions like a heuristic, betrayal aversion is somewhat different than
the heuristics that Tversky and Kahneman identified in the 1970's. It is not an all-
purpose heuristic used in many different settings. Broad-based heuristics like
availability and representativeness operate like rules of mathematics, covering all
decisions on probability without regard to setting or context. Betrayal aversion, by
contrast, reflects a reaction to a particular, circumscribed social circumstance-a reaction
to those settings that involve a breach of trust.
Furthermore, the research does not fully identify how or why people will identify a
situation as involving a breach of trust; it merely documents the reaction people have to
such a breach. Sunstein does not assume that all people will experience betrayal in the
same way in the same settings (and neither do Koehler and Gershoff). People with
different cultural worldviews may well experience betrayal in different settings. The
idea that people react negatively to betrayal itself allows for such variations, making it
easier to see how this heuristic is compatible with the research on cultural cognition than
the representativeness heuristic. Handgun owners might not feel the betrayal of a gun
accident (or they might feel more betrayed because they see the gun as a precaution not
as a weapon), whereas handgun opponents might deem a handgun accident an ironic
betrayal (or might feel that the owner got what was expected). Research on the
representativeness heuristic suggests that to the extent to which activities resemble
dangerous undertakings, people treat them as if they are dangerous, regardless of the
underlying risk. But such treatment fails to account for variations in how individuals
assess risk. Betrayal aversion, by contrast, has variation built in.
Furthermore, the idea of betrayal aversion is one that proponents of ecological
rationality can support much more easily than the representativeness heuristic.
Evolutionary psychologists, in particular, argue that humans have an ancestral need to be
highly vigilant against betrayal. 63 Cooperation was essential to the survival of hunter-
gatherer bands of human ancestors, but cooperative undertakings are vulnerable to
exploitation by a defector. Human ancestors who were known to react strongly and
punish betrayal aggressively likely deterred defection, therebyfacilitating productive
cooperation within their group. Ancestors known to tolerate defection would attract
defectors who would destroy group cohesiveness. Such accounts might be little more
than "just so" stories, but the idea of a universally strong reaction to betrayal at least
seems to have some advantages in social settings. Thus, it is easier to square with an
ecological rationality than some of the more general heuristics. Koehler and Gershoff, in
fact, argue directly that betrayal aversion is rational.6 4
62. Koehler & Gershoff, supra n. 58, at 253-54.
63. Cosmides & Tooby, supra n. 43, at 177.
64. Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion Is Reasonable, 28 Behavioral & Brain
Sci. 556, 557 (2005) ("[W]e are not persuaded that a finding that people are willing to incur some additional
cost to avoid betrayal provides sufficient evidence of a moral heuristic gone awry.").
20081
HeinOnline -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 877 2007-2008
TULSA LAW RE VIEW
The other heuristics Sunstein catalogues also display a greater flexibility. Consider
Sunstein's heuristic, "do not knowingly cause a human death." More than an
admonishment against committing homicide, the heuristic is a means of analyzing
complex moral dilemmas. When faced with action that deliberately causes death and
inaction that causes death, people seem to prefer inaction, even if more lives end up
being lost as a result.65 Like betrayal aversion, the concept of avoiding deliberate action
that causes death is not an attempt to articulate a broad, mathematical rule for how
people resolve and weigh all moral dilemmas. It is a particular reaction to a particular
situation. Once again, it is still a bit nomothetic. But it is also so specific as to allow for
variation in how people process situations. People might see situations differently-
some might see connections between their actions and consequences as more direct than
others; some might treat an action as inaction. These variations on perspective would
undoubtedly be influenced by culture, attitudes, and the like.
Like betrayal aversion, the prohibition against deliberately causing another's death
fits well with ecological rationality. Only in a vastly more interconnected modem world
do humans face the moral consequences of indirectly causing each other harm through
action (voting for a political candidate who starts a war that produces collateral injury to
civilians) and inaction (failing to donate to charity that cannot save lives as a
consequence of lack of funding). The human brain evolved to process a much smaller
social universe than we face today. But in ordinary social settings, the prohibition
against directly causing death functions as a sensible way of deciding how to act.
And so Sunstein has embarked upon a more nuanced course that seems to avoid
some of the major concerns of the heuristics that have been common currency in
behavioral law and economics thus far. He charts a new methodological course for the
field that considers context carefully and identifies how people think in that context that
allows for variations in how people might perceive the circumstances in which they find
themselves. Sunstein's approachmakes people seem less misguided and stupid than the
more general heuristics, and will strike many observers as a more plausible account of
how simple rules affect judgment.
D. The Heuristics and Biases Approach: Denouement
Sunstein tries to sidestep the debate between the proponents of the heuristics and
biases approach and the proponents of ecological rationality.6 6 But his intense reliance
on the concept of heuristics means that he must inevitably address this debate. Indeed,
he does so, implicitly. After Sunstein's restatement, the basic lessons of the heuristics
and biases approach remain intact. That is, he argues that people do not always make
judgments that are in their best interests. Rather, they make predictable mistakes that a
regulatory or legal structure can sometimes help them to avoid. Even though the
heuristics that Sunstein identifies are less grand and overarching, they still embrace the
concept that people overuse heuristics.
65. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 540-4 1.
66. Id. at 532 ("For present purposes, it is unnecessary to resolve these debates here.").
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Consider betrayal aversion as an example. Punishing a security guard who
commits a robbery more seriously than a janitor is defensible. Assigning greater
punitive damages against a manufacturer of a smoke alarm whose defective wiring led to
a fire than against a manufacturer of a refrigerator with the same problem is more
troubling. But declining to use a safety precaution (such as a vaccine) which avoids
more risk than it causes is destructive. The uncritical effort to avoid betrayals produces
this mistake and induces people to take unnecessary risks.
The more nuanced perspective on heuristics that Sunstein articulates does not lead
to the conclusion that people are highly rational creatures after all. It does not support
the tenets of ecological rationality. Sunstein articulates a conception of heuristics that is
more tailored to individuals and to contexts, but also shows that the overuse of heuristics
still occurs and still produces indefensible judgments. People are more nuanced and
contextual than the original framework suggests, but they still make important errors.
This new approach highlights an important observation about context and
heuristics that is evolving in the literature on judgment and decision-making. That is,
heuristics that are learned in one context and then used in another can be destructive.
67
Heuristics are likely learned as a means of addressing simple dilemmas that people
encounter in their everyday lives. In ordinary social interaction, it makes good sense to
avoid those who will betray us, for example. And most people would be horrified at the
prospect of deliberately causing the death of another person. But these heuristics are
good for social interaction, not for broad-scale social planning. Heuristics are tools that
the human mind uses for particular purposes. Using them in the wrong context is no
different than using a hammer to do brain surgery.
The problem of mismatched heuristics is easily seen with the "Linda problem."
The problem can easily be answered using the simplest deductive logic but is hard to
answer using one's intuition. People who rely on intuition are simply using the wrong
tool. Many of the classic problems of judgment and choice are similar-people make
mistakes because they rely on the wrong way of thinking about a problem. Their mental
representation of the solution set is simply incomplete or leads to the wrong conclusions.
Good judgment requires a match between the cognitive process being used and the type
of problem being solved.
As the next section shows, Sunstein has other fish to fry, and perhaps did not mean
to address the debate between the heuristics and biases approach and ecological
rationality. But his analysis weighs in on the debate. Sunstein's approach to heuristics
surprisingly shows that the psychology of judgment and choice can embrace the major
critiques leveled against the literature on judgment and choice without changing the
basic conclusion that people make important mistakes in judgment. People will use what
tools they have available to solve the problems that they encounter, whether those tools
are sensible ones or not. They will try to paint a wall with a hammer if a hammer is all
that is available, or the nature of the problem somehow deceives them into thinking that
67. See Callia Piperides et al., Group Report: What is the Role of Heuristics in Litigation? in Heuristics and
the Law 343, 349 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., MIT Press 2006).
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they are really facing a nail that needs pounding. Whether this approach to judgment and
choice will ultimately attract empirical support remains an open question. But it does
address some of the major concerns levied against the heuristics and biases approach.
II. SUNSTEIN ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Sunstein's novel direction might be an advance for psychology, but it was an aside
to his primary target-moral philosophy. Sunstein argues that the methods of moral
philosophy require people to use cognitive processes that are incompatible with the
underlying issues being addressed. He contends that the basis of moral philosophical
discourse relies too heavily on intuition that arises from the reliance on misplaced
heuristics. In effect, moral philosophy induces people to use a hammer to paint a wall,
and the result is apt to be messy.
Summarizing the full scope of the methods moral philosophers use to advance their
arguments lies beyond the scope of this essay and beyond Sunstein's efforts as well. But
it is hard to deny the importance of intuitive reasoning in moral philosophy. As Sunstein
notes, the well-known Trolley Problem is a case in point.6 8 The basic version of the
problem asks people to imagine that they see five passengers on a runaway trolley,
headed for certain destruction. They can save these five by throwing a switch that would
divert the trolley to a safe course, saving the five passengers, but the diversion will end
up killing one bystander who happens to be standing on the safe route. The problem thus
asks people if they will act in a way that kills one but saves five. Most people struggle,
but agree that they would divert the trolley. But if the hypothetical is altered so that the
only way to stop the trolley is by pushing a portly individual off of a footbridge onto the
tracks so as to stop the trolley, fewer agree to sacrifice the one to save the five. The
hypothetical is designed to illustrate the greater moral dilemma associated with direct,
forceful action.
Or, consider the Violinist Problem as a means of illustrating the vagaries of
morality dealing with abortion. 6 9 The hypothetical question in the violinist problem asks
one to imagine that they have been kidnapped by a group of classical music fanatics.
These fanatics are determined to save a famous violinist, who is suffering from failures
of his major organs. He can be saved through a transplant, and a donor will ultimately be
available, but not for nine months. To save him, his blood stream must be attached to
that of someone who matches his genetic makeup closely, so as to use the host's own
liver and kidneys to filter his blood and keep him alive while he waits for a transplant.
The fanatics have somehow learned that you are a match for the violinist and have
therefore kidnapped you and attached him to you. Carrying around the violinist is a
nuisance, and it is mildly dangerous. You can struggle and detach yourself, but doing so
will kill the violinist. Moral philosophers ask whether it is morally acceptable for you to
detach yourself. The problem is obviously meant to replicate the dilemma faced by a
68. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 540 (discussing the Trolley Problem).
69. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, I Phil. & Pub. Affairs 47, 48-49 (1971) (first describing
the Violinist Problem).
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woman who has been raped and impregnated and is choosing whether to have an
abortion. Moral philosophers argue that if one thinks it is morally acceptable for you to
detach yourself from the violinist, then how could it be any different for a woman in such
a situation to have an abortion?
As Sunstein asserts, the enterprise of moral philosophy is founded largely on
testing variations in the intuition in these kinds of hypothetical questions to identify
guiding principles of ethical conduct. 70  Philosophers add a good dose of logical
deduction to the undertaking, of course. They seek to compare and contrast these kinds
of hypothetical questions to smoke out logical inconsistencies. They puzzle over large
differences that they find between apparently anomalous intuitions, such as that between
direct action in the Trolley Problem and highly direct action in the footbridge version of
the problem. The effort is intended to produce a kind of "reflective equilibrium," where
intuition plays a guiding role, but is tempered by efforts to smooth out logical
inconsistencies in these intuitions. 
7 1
Sunstein rejects the whole enterprise as misguided. He finds most troubling the
widespread reliance on intuitive reactions to somewhat anomalous and unusual
situations. No one would try to found a theory of probability, set theory, or mathematics
entirely on intuition. The literature on heuristics and biases should convince anyone that
doing so would be a hopeless enterprise. It is precisely when people are relying on their
intuition to answer problems involving probability that they are led astray. The intuitive
answer to the "Linda problem" could not provide a basis for developing set theory. And
adding and comparing further such hypothetical questions seems unlikely to be a
profitable means of creating a deductive theory. Problems of this sort are best addressed
by converting the propositions into symbols and relying on a small number of axioms to
solve them. From the time of ancient Greece to the present day, the construction of
deductive and mathematical principles has been guided by symbolic propositions, not
intuition-and wisely so.
It has been a great puzzle for psychologists studying judgment and choice, in fact,
that intuition about probability and deductive logic deviates so markedly from logical
principles. The discrepancy between the answers people's intuition produces and the
teachings of deductive logic underlies some of the backlash against the early literature on
heuristics and biases. It has led many to embrace ecological rationality, as discussed
above. But most have simply accepted that intuition and deductive logic are not the
same, 72 and conclude that it is extremely difficult to develop a unified theory of human
judgment and choice that is both descriptively accurate and normatively logical.7 3 If that
is correct, then relying on intuition to construct a system of logic, probability, or
mathematics would be deeply misguided.
70. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 541.
71. Id. at 542. As Sunstein notes, the term "reflective equilibrium" comes from Rawls. Id.
72. See Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 Psychol. Sci. 94, 94 (Jan.
2002) (describing the broad influence that the research program of Tversky and Kahneman has had).
73. See R. Duncan Luce & Detlof von Winterfeldt, What Common Ground Exists for Descriptive,
Prescriptive, and Normative Utility Theories? 40 Mgt. Sci. 263, 263-64 (1994) (describing the challenges to
identifying a descriptively accurate and normatively coherent theory of subjective expected utility).
2008]
HeinOnline -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 881 2007-2008
TULSA LAW REVIEW
But Sunstein asserts that moral philosophers appear to be engaged in precisely this
hopeless enterprise. The similarities between the hypothetical scenarios that moral
philosophers craft and those Tversky and Kahneman created are astonishing.74 Both
approaches construct highly unusual fact patterns. Both involve tinkering with the facts
to make contrasts and comparisons that might reveal how people think, and both show
many internal inconsistencies. The two approaches appear to diverge only in how they
treat the inconsistencies. Tversky and Kahneman recognize the inconsistencies as
evidence that people rely on intuitive decision-making processes that are often divorced
from the demands of logic. They then use the inconsistencies to construct descriptively
accurate theories as to how people really think. In contrast, moral philosophers try to
rationalize the inconsistencies and use them as the foundations of ethical principles.
They try to smooth out the rough edges and come to moral equilibrium, but intuition lies
at the heart of the basic principles of their approach. They accept theories that are
descriptively accurate, but also those that they label normative and appropriate.
For Sunstein, this is a house built on sand. Intuition is valuable in many ways. It
is especially useful when quick judgments are necessary. But it leads to predictable
mistakes. Moral philosophy's heavy reliance on exotic hypothetical scenarios is
particularly troubling. Exotic hypothetical scenarios seem particularly likely to induce
people to use the wrong cognitive tools, as they are unfamiliar settings. Heuristics
developed for everyday life are nearly certain to cause mischief when used to solve
problems with unusual contexts. The heuristics that support intuition lead to poor
choices in exotic settings and should be identified as such, not embraced as a foundation
for any coherent moral theory.
Obviously, this bold thesis needs more development than the initial account
Sunstein describes in the paper. Philosophers can respond that their efforts to reconcile
intuition with deductive logic are doing more than just smoothing out some edges, they
are bringing rigor to deduction. Sunstein might respond by asking why they bother with
the intuition, but moral philosophers can respond back that they can hardly do without it,
when so much of how people describe their moral judgments is intuitive in nature.
Indeed the work by psychologist Jonathan Haidt supports this point.75 He asserts that
moral judgments are much like aesthetic ones. People begin with a sense that some
conduct is right or wrong, and only then try to supply the reasoning. Morality might be
fundamentally so intuitive that intuition cannot be removed.
All of this will require more development, but the adaptive approach to heuristics
that Sunstein embraces in the paper is an essential step in launching his challenge to
philosophers. If intuition and heuristics are normatively sound and logical, albeit so
contextual that the underlying rationality is hard to identify, then philosophers remain on
firm footing. The new challenge arises out of the recognition that heuristics are
adaptable and yet they still lead to errors. Even though Sunstein asserts he is not taking
74. Sunstein, supra n. 1, at 541 ("[P]hilosophical analysis, based on exotic moral dilemmas, is inadvertently
and even comically replicating the early work of Kahneman and Tversky.").
75. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814 (2001).
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sides in the debate about ecological rationality, his conclusion that heuristics produce
errors is necessary to ensure that the challenge to philosophy remains intact. Lay
intuition is simply a shortcut, and it has no place in a fully developed theory that is
supposed to be logically coherent. It has no place in other normative systems such as
probability theory, deductive logic, or mathematics, so why should it be useful to the
development of an understanding of morality?
III. CONCLUSION
Whatever the outcome of Sunstein's challenge to moral philosophy and the utility
of his new approach to heuristics, it shows how breathtaking Sunstein"s contributions to
intellectual life in the academy have become. His work fundamentally changes law,
psychology, economics, political science, and, now even philosophy. He even so
introduces paradigm-shifting concepts when he is not even trying. He sees the
development of a new approach to heuristics only as a handy tool with which to attack
philosophers, and yet it also represents a new way of avoiding many of the pitfalls that
the psychology of judgment and choice has faced. His attack on philosophy also
inadvertently preserves the strength of the many arguments he has made in support of
paternalistic intervention to save people from common errors in judgment. Given all
that, one can only sense that the best of Sunstein's work is yet to come. I just hope the
rest of us can keep up with it.
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